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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

In regard to DARRELL WAYNE
MORRIS, Witness/Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 20150187-CA
ST ATE OF UTAH,

•

Plaintiff,
v.

DANNY LEROY LOGUE,

Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT.
R. APP. P. 3 over this appeal from the Ruling and Order - Contempt ofCourt Re: Darrell

Wayne Morris ("Judgment"), dated February 12, 2015 by the Honorable Derek M. Pullan
of the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, sentencing Morris to a prison term
of thirty (30) days in the county jail to run consecutive with his prison sentence and
ordering him to pay a fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, ($1 ,000.00) for his
conviction of contempt. A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and
incorporated herein by this reference.

•
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err when it failed to address the harm issue Morris
raised in his Motion to Quash, of being at a substantial risk of bodily
harm or death if he testified in the Logue trial?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate review ofa denial ofa motion to quash

a subpoena is conducted under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Grand Jury
Subpoenas Dated Dec. 7 and 8, Issues to Bob Stover, Chief of Albuquerque Police
Department v. United States, 1100, see also Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d

1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 13 F.3d 1293, 1295
(9th Cir. 1994). However, if the denial of a request to quash rises to a constitutional
violation, the matter is reviewed de novo. Id., citing United States v. Thody, 978 F.2d 625,
628 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 907, 115 S.Ct. 273, 130 L.Ed.2d 190 (1994).
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved by the filing of Morris' Motion to

Quash Witness Subpoena for Darrell Wayne Morris on January 28, 2015. RL:02050-

02054, and the argument of such Motion on January 30, 2015. R01294:5-54.
ISSUE II:

Did the trial'. court err in determining that Morris had no Fifth
Amendment privilege to assert as a reason to not testify at the Logue
trial?

STAND ARD OF REVIEW: "Constitutional issues ... are questions oflaw that we

review for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, if25, 100 P.3d 1177.
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved by it being raised before the trial

court in the Motion to Quash pleading and during oral arguments on January 30, 2015, as
to whether Morris was going to testify. The trial court ruled on such issue.
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V states as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
B. UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 states as follows:
(a)(l) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter
before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal
investigation or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with whom
an information is filed, the prosecuting attorney on his or her own
initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an
information or indictment is to be tried ... An attorney admitted to practice
in the court in which the action is pending may also issue and sign a
subpoena as an officer of the court ... (b) The court may quash or modify
the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable .... (c) Applicability
of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions of Rule 45,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall govern the content, issuance, and
service of subpoenas to the extent that those provisions are consistent
with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
C. UT. R. CIV. P. 8l(e) states, "These rules of procedure shall also govern in any

,

aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule,
provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or
constitutional requirement.
D. UT. R. CIV. P. 45 states as follows:
Every subpoena shall: (a)(l)(A) issue from the court in which the action
is pending; (a)(l)(B) state the title and case number of the action, the
name of the court from which it is issued, and the name and address of
the party or attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena; (a)(l )(C)
3

command each person to whom it is directed (a)(l)(C)(i) to appear and
give testimony at a trial, hearing or deposition, ... (a)(l)(D) if an
appearance is required, specify the date, time and place for the appearance
... (b )( 1) A subpoena may be served by any person who is at least 18 years
of age and not a party to the case. Service of a subpoena upon the person
to whom it is directed shall be made as provided in Rule 4(d). (b)(2) If
the subpoena commands a person's appearance, the party or attorney
responsible for issuing the subpoena shall tender with the subpoena the
fees for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law. When the
subpoena is issued on behalf of the United States, or this state, or any
officer or agency of either, fees and mileage need not be tendered .. . (e)(3)
The person subject to the subpoena or a non-party affected by the
subpoena may object under Rule 37 if the subpoena: ... (e)(5) If objection
is made, or if a party requests a protective order, the party or attorney
responsible for issuing the subpoena is not entitled to compliance but may
request an order to compel compliance under Rule 37(a). The objection
or request shall be served on the other parties and on the person subject
to the subpoena. An order compelling compliance shall protect the person
subject to or affected by the subpoena from significant expense or harm.
The court may quash or modify the subpoena.
E. United States Department of Justice Petite Policy: Dual and Successive
Prosecution Policy ("Petite Policy"). United States Attorneys Manual,
Title 9: Criminal, 9-2.031(1).
F. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961-racketeering,
18 U.S.C.A. § 1111-murder
18 U.S.C.A. § 1117--conspiracy to murder
Other relevant U.S. Code provisions

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 1, 2011 , Darrell Wayne Morris ("Morris") and Danny Leroy Logue
("Logue") were charged by separate Information with Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated

Murder, a first degree felony;

Aggravated Murder, a first degree felony; Purchase,

Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a second degree felony;
Obstructing Justice, a second degree felony; seven (7) counts of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, all first degree felonies ; Manufacture of a Vehicle
4
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Compartment for Contraband, a third degree felony; and Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a second degree felony. RM :00009; RL :000007. 1
A joint preliminary hearing was held on August 31, 2012, after which the trial court
took the matter under advisement. RM:00066; RL:000044. The trial court entered its
Memorandum Decision and Order on Bindover on September 11, 2012 binding over both

Morris and Logue for trial. RM:00109; RL:00085. On November 19, 2012 Morris filed a
Motion to Quash the Bindover. RM:00125. On November 20, 2012 Logue filed a Motion
to Quash the Bindover. RL:R00102. On December 7, 2012 the State filed a Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Quash Bindover. RM:00157; RL:00120. On

August 21, 2013 the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on
Defendant 's Motions to Quash Bindover upholding its bindover decision. RM:00203;

RL:00241.
On September 10, 2013 Logue filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Outcome
of Interlocutory Appeal; and Memorandum in Support. RL:00267. On September 12,

2013 Morris and Logue filed a joint Petition for Interlocutory appeal with the Utah
Supreme Court. RM:00219; RL:00274. Such Interlocutory Petition was later denied. On
September 24, 2013 Morris filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Interlocutory
Petition. RM:00246.

'This matter began as a consolidated matter. Thus, there are two (2) records which must be
cited in this matter. The record for Morris is referenced herein as "RM" and the record for
Logue is referenced as "RL."
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After the denial of the Interlocutory Petition the following Pre-trial Motions were
filed:
l. State's Motion in Limine to Admit Co-Conspirator Statements, filed February
27, 2014, RM:00300, RL:00354; a Response in Opposition was filed on April
15, 2014, RM:00588, RL:00764;
2. State's Motion in Limine to Admit Yuri Lara's Statement "Andy's Dead" filed
February 27, 2014, RM:00359, RL:00308; a Response in Opposition was filed
on April 15, 2014, RM:00574, RL:00801;
3. State's Motion to Allow Co-Conspirator Liability Argument and Instruction,

filed February 27, 2014, RM:00368, RL:00317; a Response in Opposition was
filed on April 15, 2014, RM:00609, RL:0787;
4. State's Motion in Limine to Admit the Transcript of Yuri Lara's Entry of Plea
and/or Audio Record Thereof and/or His Written Statement in Advance of Plea
Document at Trial; filed February 27, 2014, RM:00325, RL:00376; a Response

was filed April 15, 2014, RM:00641, RL:0801;
5. Motion in Limine to Enlarge Time Period to File Pre-Trial Motions, to Continue
Evidentiary Hearing, and to Continue Jury Trial, filed February 27, 2014,

RM:00329, RL:00308;
6. State's Motion for Discovery, filed on March 17, 2014, RM:00341, RL:00392;
Response in Opposition filed on April 15, 2014, RM:00624, RL:00794;
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7. State's Motion for Admission ofCertain Photographs into Evidence, filed March
20, 2014, RM:00352, RL:00403; Response in Opposition filed April 15, 2014,
RM:00633, RL:00748;
8. State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Robin Jacksons Prior Thefts; filed March
28, 2014, RM:00354, RL:00405; Response filed April 15, 2014, RM:00617,
RL:00737;
9. Motion in Limine to Exclude Witnesses filed April 1, 2014, RM:003 56-003 82,
RL:00593-00621 , Response filed April 15, 2014, RM:00533, RL:00673;
10. Motion in Limine to Exclude Cell Phone Tower Records and Request for
Hearing Pursuant to Ur. R. EVID. 702, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00384, 00511,
RL :00480, 00591;

Memorandum in Opposition filed April 17, 2014,

RM:00665, RL:00811;
I I.Motion for Change of Venue, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00386, RL:00648;
Memorandum in Opposition filed April 15, 2014, RM:00521, RL:00700;
12. Motion for Discovery Order Directing State to Provide Prosecution Witnesses

,

Criminal Histories and Plea Agreements in this Matter and Memorandum in
Support, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00396-00410, RL:00463-00478; Response
filed on April 15, 2014, RM:00564, RL:00794;
13.Motion to Exclude Prior Bad Acts and Convictions Pursuant to UT. R. EVID
404(b) filed April 1, 2014, RM:000412-00426, RL:00482-00496; Response

filed on April 17, 2014, RM:00675, RL:00821;
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14. Motion to Sever Co-Defendants Criminal Trial, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00428450, RL:00623-00646; Response filed on April 18, 2014, RM:00693, RL:00839;

15.Motion to Suppress Cellular Telephone Information, April 1, 2014, RM:00452503; RL:00407-00459, Opposition filed April 15, 2014, RM:00533, RL:00712;

16.Motion in Limine to Permit Defendant to Wear Business Attire and to conceal
visible evidence of Defendants Incarceration and Restraints at Trial; filed April
1, 2015, RM:00513-00516, RL:00665; Response filed on April 15, 2014,
RM:00567, RL:00715; and
17. Briefre: Motion in Limine to Exclude Cell Phone Tower Records; filed July 14,
2014, RM: 01174-01196; RL:1237-1261.
The following Motions were filed in Logue's case but not in the Morris' matter:
1. Motion in Limine to Prohibit Description, Use, or References to Gangs and

Incarceration; RL:01478; Memorandum in Opposition was filed on December
22, 2014, RL:01545;

2. Motion to Disclose CI Packet on William Thompson, filed April 2, 2014,
RL :00668, Response was filed on April 18, 2014, RL:00845.
On May 21, 2014 the Ruling and Order Re: State's Motion for Discovery was filed,
RM:00850, RL:01002. On July 14, 2014, the following orders were filed:
1. Order Excluding Retail Theft Conviction, RM:01201, RL:1290;
2. Order Denying Motion to Exclude Witnesses, RM:01207, RL:1281;
3. Order Admitting Co-conspirator Statements in Part, RM:0 1217; RL 1271;
4. Order Denying Motion to Suppress CSL,;RM:01221, RL:01285;
8

5. Order Denying Change of Venue; RM:01225, RL:1275;
6. Order Admitting Statement Andy's Dead, RM:01231, RL:01293;
On July 15, 2014 the Second Amended Information was entered for Morris. It
charged Morris with Manslaughter, a second degree felony; Obstructing Justice, a second
degree felony; and Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by
Restricted Person, a third degree felony. RM:01234. On July 15, 2014 the Statement of
Defendant in Support of Plea of Guilty or No Contest and Certificate of Counsel was filed
("Plea Agreement"), RM:R01244.

On July 15, 2014, the Sentence, Judgment, and

Commitment was entered. RM:RO 1228.

On August 14, 2014 the Ruling and Order Re: State's Motion to Allow CoConspirator Liability Argument and Instruction was entered. RM:01263. On September

23, 2014 the Motion to Examine Witnesses Confined in Prison was filed. RM:01265;
RL:01431, 1490.
On July 14, 2014 the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the State's Motion
to Admit Co-Conspirator Statements was entered. RM:01271, RL:01423, 01458, 01468.
The Order to Examine Witnesses Confined in Prison was entered on November 21, 2014.

RL:01466.
On December 15, 2014 the Motion to Exclude the Testimony ofBrandon Wright and
Memorandum in Support was filed. RL:01513. Such Motion indicated that on October

21, 2014 Wright had an interview with law enforcement indicating that he had information
relevant to this matter. RL:001512. Wright indicated that he had previous affiliation with
a gang called Silent Aryan Warriors ("SAW"), from which he claimed to have retired
9
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before his last parole in 2006. Id. Wright indicated that when he was informed when he
returned to prison that SAW was under new management and he would be required to
'"push steel" and that he could not retire. Id.
The motion to exclude Wright's testimony specifically stated as follows:
5. In a letter written by Wright and disclosed by the prosecution to counsel
herein, Wright states that he was approached by SAW upon reaching
population in prison and told that SAW was under new management and
that he would be called upon to "push steel", which was their new focus.
Wright allegedly reminded them of his "retirement" from the gang and
they told him that it did not work that way anymore. A copy of the letter
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
6. Wright further states in the letter as follows:
I was also recently ordered to carry out a stabbing by someone who
told me if I did not go through with it he would have to send me out
sideways. He added emphasis that he was another breed of killer and
that he is in charge now. He told me he has already ordered two other
stabbings that have been carried out here in the prison in the last
year ... He told me details about his currently pending murder that I
think only the killer could possibly know and so I need you to please
ask the Utah County Prosecutor to come and talk to me ASAP. He
provided me with the shank and told me how to do it. . .Instead of
carrying out my order I created a big (obvious) commotion (hitting
doors, etc.) and ensured immediate officers attention was drawn to the
situation. I was brought to Uinta II for possession of the shank ...
Id.
7. Wright's letter concludes with him making an offer in exchange for
providing information, stating specifically as follows:
All I ask is that I be permitted to go to Olympus after I supply all info
and do whatever controlled buys or stings that are requested; be
allowed to roll up my own stuff so it's not pilfered again by inmates;
immunity; and that I get consideration for a special attention to the
Board of Pardons to request termination (my date is next year)
because I will be on gang hit lists here and will want to leave Utah for
good.
RL1510-l l.

10

In his interview Wright allegedly told law enforcement some specifics about this
matter that he had learned from Logue. RL:001511. Wright told law enforcement that
Logue and "Wicked," which is an alias for Morris, went to beat someone up, parked away
from the house, approached the house, and walked on the front lawn. RL:001510. Wright
indicated the individual they were looking for was on the front porch on his phone. Id.
The individual told Wicked and Logue that he would call police if they came any closer.
Id.

Wright told law enforcement that Logue then shot him, but that Logue had acted

impulsively and did not mean for it to happen that way. Id. Wright told law enforcement
that after the shooting Logue and Wicked "got lost", Logue stashed the gun, Wicked got
sick at a store, and that Logue returned to where the gun was and switched it for a different
gun. Id. The Motion argued that Wright testimony should be inadmissible because he
wanted something for his testimony, could not be trustworthy, and that he could have
gotten the information from looking over Logue's legal documents. RL:001499. The
State's Opposition was filed December 29, 2014, RL:01581. On December 17, 2014 the
State filed its Motion on Procedural Issues. RL:0 1521. On December 31, 2014 the State

,

filed its Motion to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Hansen. RL:01605. Logue filed a response
on January 12, 2015. RL:0 1722.
On January 28, 2015, the Motion to Quash Witness Subpoena for Darrell Wayne
Morris was filed. RL:02050-02054. Such Motion argued that the subpoena should be

quashed based upon his Fifth Amendment privilege. R002049. Morris argues that he is
subject to both State and Federal prosecution because they are dual sovereigns and thus,
can bring separate criminal actions. R00204 7. Dual prosecutions do not offend double
11

,

.
jeopardy principles. R002046. Morris cannot be prosecuted by the State again for any
firearm charge related to this matter because he has pied but he could be prosecuted under
federal statute. Id. Morris also argues that because of this risk and pursuant to UT. R.
CRIM.

P. 14(a)(2) that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and it should

be quashed. Id. Morris argued that the State had not shown its intent to compel him to
testify under the grant use of immunity by giving him notice although he had received a
subpoena and objected to it. R02045. Morris objected based upon his understanding that
the State had made him two (2) offers the first which required him to testify the second
which did not. Id. Morris took the second offer so that he would not have to testify. Id.
Morris argues that the State knew of his objection as earlier as January 16, 2015 and still
neither the State nor the U.S. Attorney's Office had made an offer of immunity to Morris
by January 28, 2015. Id.
Morris indicated that the State indicated that there was no agreement as to testimony
and that they had reserved the right to subpoena Morris to testify at the Logue trial. Id.
The State's representations on July 15, 2014 led Morris to reasonably believe that he would
not be called as a witness. Id. Morris believed if he was called it was only because he
would be a rebuttal case if Logue testified. R002044.
More importantly, Morris argued that under UT. R. CRIM. P. 45(c)(5) that he should
not be compelled or ordered to give testimony because he was at risk of significant harm
or death from others ifhe testified against Logue. R002043. Thus, Morris argues he should
not be compelled to testify. R002042. The Certification of Service for service of the
subpoena on Morris was presented and filed with the trial court on January 30, 2015.
12

On February 3, 2015 the Order on Motion in Limine to Prohibit Description, Use,
or Reference to Gangs and Incarceration was entered. RL: 02096. In such Order the trial

court ruled that references to "incarceration" could be used as background information but
if "undue emphasis" was placed on Logue's incarceration, the Court would revisit the
Motion. RL:002095. The trial court ruled that no evidence of the gang name "Silent Aryan
Warriors" or SAW would be permitted. RL:02093. The trial court reserved any ruling on
I

the remainder of the Order on Motion in Limine to Prohibit Description, Use, or Reference
to Gangs and Incarceration until trial. RL:02092.

On February 3, 2015 the Order on the Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony
of Brandon Wright was entered. RL:02103. In such Order the trial court determined that

Wright's testimony was not so unfair that its admission would violate the fundamental
conceptions of justice. RL:002099. The trial court determined that the prosecutor had
"critically important duties relating to jailhouse informants" and ordered that the State
immediately disclose all information given to it by Wright or the investigators to the
defense. Id. The State should provide Wright's criminal history and all agreements or
promises made to Wright for testifying in writing to the defense. RL:002098. The State

•

should provide all internal policies within its office for the screening of jailhouse
informants and their statements or testimony to the defense no later than January 20, 2015.
Id. If the State failed to do this the trial court reserved the right to revisit the Motion in
Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Brandon Wright. R002097.

On February 12, 2015, the Ruling and Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell
Wayne Morris; Order of Commitment; Warrant in Aid of Commitment was entered.
13

RL:02215. In such Order the trial court indicated that Morris had been offered immunity
for his testimony, and that Morris refused to answer questions. RL:02215. The trial court
also indicated it had found that Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege based upon the
immunity offer, and that Morris was found in contempt of court for his failure to testify.
Id. Morris was seated on the stand and he refused to testify. Id. The trial court ordered

that Morris pay $1,000 fine and serve thirty (30) days in the County jail for such contempt,
consecutive to the time he was already serving in prison. RL:02214. On March 13, 2015
Notice ofAppeal-Contempt ofCourt-in regard to Witness Darrell Wayne Morris was filed.

RL:02254.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plea and Sentencing: July 15, 2014
A proposed plea agreement was presented to the trial court. RM01285:3 . The plea
agreement contained the charges of Manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony; Obstruction of
Justice, a 2nd degree felony; and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person,
a 3rd degree felony. Id. at p. 3-4. Morris pled guilty to all three (3) counts with the
sentences for each to run concurrently with each other as well as concurrently to the
sentence he had previously received in a 2011 forgery case for which Morris was on parole.
Id. at p. 4.

Morris also agreed to be sentenced to prison with no credit for time served.

Id. at p. 6. The agreement did not indicate that Morris would be subpoenaed to testify. Id.

at p. 7. The agreement was silent on his willingness to do so. Id. However, the State
indicated that it was reserving the right to subpoena him if necessary. Id.

14

The State

indicated that they did not intend to call him, but that it would depend on how Logue' s trial
went. Id.
Morris was subpoenaed to testify at the trial of Danny LeRoy Logue. He appeared
for that purpose on January 30, 2015.
B. Trial of Danny Logue on January 30 2 2015
Oral arguments were heard by the trial court on Morris' Motion to Quash his trial

,

subpoena. R0001294:5. Morris argued that the court either quash his subpoena or modify
it to limit the State's ability to call him as a rebuttal witness, and only after Logue had
testified. Id. at p. 5.

Morris' counsel indicated that the totality of the circumstances

included what had occurred in chambers at the hearing on July 15, 2014 and what the State
represented to the parties at that time. Id. at p. 6. Morris' counsel indicated that he had not
received an actual subpoena, just verbal notice that the State intended to call Morris on
January 29, 2015 at 1:00 p.m. Id. at p. 6. Morris' counsel indicated that he received an
email from the State on January 16, 2015 indicating that the State had received a hand
written letter from Morris. Id. Morris' counsel indicated that the letter objected to the

,

subpoena based on his understanding that he believed that he had deal with the State not to
testify. Id. at p. 6. Morris' counsel indicated that Morris acknowledged in his handwritten
letter that he was told the State wanted to leave the issue of testifying open and Morris said
no.

Id.

Counsel indicates the letter is not dated, the issue here is it's a matter of

transparency. Id.
Morris's counsel indicated that it asks the court to look at the totality of the
circumstances, six (6) months previously the State had indicated that it did not intend to
15

call Morris. Id. at p. 7. Morris' counsel indicated that the clear implication from the State
on July 15, 2014 was that they would call Morris in the rebuttal case depending on what
Logue does. Id. Morris counsel again indicates that he and co-counsel have not received
a copy of the subpoena and that Rule 14 does not require that counsel needs to be served a
copy of the subpoena but points out the matter of State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, i!3 l. Id.
Counsel indicates that Gonzales indicates what's required with Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 14, and notice to adverse parties. Id. Counsel indicated that Gonzales
indicated "in evaluation the merits of Mr. Gonzales' interpretation that Criminal Rule 14
silence regarding notice is intentional, the Court wrote we note that the test of Rule l 4(b),
and Rule l 4(b) is referring the victims' records, clearly signals that some notice to adverse
parties of the issuance of a subpoena is contemplated." Id. Counsel asks the court to rule
on what is some notice and is the notice verbal. Id.
Morris' counsel argued that Morris isn't specifically an adverse party to the Logue
matter, but that he is adverse and that he was a co-defendant, who pled out and was
sentenced and that he then became an adverse party. Id. at p. 8. Counsel indicates that on
July 15, 2014 when he entered a plea the State was not going to call him. Id. Counsel
believes the sticking point is the plea negotiations. Id. Counsel indicates that generally
evidence of plea negotiations are inadmissible under U.R.E. Rule 408. Id. However,
counsel indicates there are exceptions to this rule and argues that Morris' understanding or
the affect of what was represented to him is relevant and admissible under the exception to
Rule 408 in that his understanding was that he had two (2) offers from the State one to
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testify and one not to testify. Id. at p. 8. Morris specifically accepted the offer to not
testify. Id.
Morris' counsel indicated he informed the State this is the offer the Morris wanted
and there was a major dispute and they came to court. On July 15, 2014, there was no
agreement on testimony or no testimony but Morris' understanding of the effect of the offer
was that he would not testify and that is mostly consistent with what the court represented
to the Court on July 15, 2015 of last year. Id. Morris' counsel indicated the State had
reserved the right to call Morris. Id.
The State argues the court that the plea deal did not involve an agreement with the
State to not call Morris and Morris was aware of that. Id. The State had offered Morris a
different agreement which did indicate they would not call him but Morris did not elect to
take that deal. Id. Morris did not take that offer because he was pleading to things that
were a great severity. Id. The State believes that Morris took the offer knowing he may
be called as a witness. Id. The State argues that at trial they are learning that Logue's
defense is that he was not even present when they were anticipating the defense would be
he was there but did not pull the trigger. Id. The State believes that Morris' testimony that
he was there is more important now although the State never made an agreement not to call
Morris. Id. The State argues that Morris' other argument is he should not testify due to
fear and that the most important witnesses in this case are fearful. Id. It is not grounds to
quash the subpoena.
The State indicated it has a return of service for the subpoena and that Morris' letter
to them clearly shows he received the subpoena. Id. at p. 10. Morris notified the State of
17

his receipt of the subpoena and protested. Id. The State argues he could have notified his
attorney's at that time. Id. The State is not aware if Morris did this but the State notified
his attorneys of the letter and his objection at the time. Id. Morris' counsel never asked
for a copy of the subpoena. Id. State argues that Morris' other argument is the Fifth
Amendment claim of privilege and the State has given Counsel the grant of immunity use
and derivative use of immunity and this mitigates the Fifth Amendment claim of privilege
and double jeopardy precludes that clam to at least the majority of the questions the State
plans to ask.

Id.

Morris' counsel indicated that the State received Morris' objection on January 16,
2015 and that he has just now seen the grant of use immunity document. Id.

Court

indicated it is not odd for the immunity of use agreement to be given to counsel on the day
of trial and Counsel agrees the rule does allow for that. Id. Morris' counsel argues that
there has to be some remedy given the totality of the circumstances, no copy of the
subpoena, not proof of service filed with the court as of yet. Id. Counsel asks the court to
give special attention and added weight to what the State told Morris' attorneys in
chambers on July 15, 2014. Id. Counsel argues that the State did not intend to call Morris
then and indicated if it did it would be for rebuttal purposes only. Id.
After hearing argument, the court orally ruled there were four grounds alleged to
quash the subpoena. Id. at p. 12. Court determined that there was no requirement that
Morris' counsel receive the subpoena. Id. Court found that failure to file the return of
service does not rise to grounds to quash the subpoena. Id. This failure can be cured and
State is directed to file return of service today. Id.
18

The trial court determined that Morris received three (3) plea options. Id.

One

was to pied to certain crimes and the State would not call him, he rejected this offer. Id.
Morris was offered to enter a plea to certain crimes and agreed to cooperate which he
rejected as well. Id. at p. 13. Morris entered into an agreement that he would plead to
certain crimes and the State would have the option to call him but he would be compelled
to participate by the subpoena powers and this is what has occurred. Id. The court ruled
that the record is clear that Morris may be called as a witness and the State used its
discretion to call him by subpoena. Id. The Court was not persuaded that the subpoena in
anyway violated the plea agreement that Morris entered. Id.
The court determined that Morris may have genuine fears of retaliation if he testifies
but it is not enough of a reason for the subpoena to be quashed. Id. A witnesses' exercise
of the Fifth Amendment privilege is not to be evidence used in a criminal case and it is
unprofessional for an attorney to call a witness to testify he knows will claim a valid
privilege for purpose of impressing upon the jury that the privilege is to be claimed. Id.
The court indicated that an attorney does not need to accept at face value every claim of
privilege no matter how frivolous. Id.

The court ruled it is sufficient to defeat the

suggestion that a witness is being called for an improper purpose when an attorney calling
his witness has an argument that the witness cannot validly make such claim. Id. at p. 14.
The trial court then addressed Yuri Lara and his Fifth Amendment privilege before
it addresses Morris' Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at p. 18. The court determined that
Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. The court determined that Morris had no
Fifth Amendment privilege because he pled guilty to criminal conduct relating to the
19

underlying offense that Logue had been charged with. Id. The court concluded Morris had
been offered immunity for any collateral conduct surrounding these events. Id. The court
determined that with respect to federal prosecution at best the "fear is fanciful and merely
speculative especially given the well-established Petite policy and Morris"' pleas. Id. The
court found that this case has no federal interest that has been demonstratively
unvindicated. Id. at p. 19. This is especially true in that Morris' police statement denies
him having any knowledge that Logue possessed a gun. Id. Based upon this statement
testimony consistent with that statement would not incriminate Morris any further. Id. The
court determined he had already incriminated himself to that extent. Id. Morris does
possess relevant and material information in this matter and the State has an argument that
he had no Fifth amendment privilege. Id.
Morris was seated on the witness stand. Id. at p. 48. He indicated to the court that
he had a chance to speak with his attorneys about being subpoenaed to testify. Id. at p. 49.
The court informed Morris that he was under a trial subpoena to testify and that if he did
not he could be found in contempt of court and serve up to thirty (30) days in jail and fined
$1,000. Id. The court also informed him he could be charged with obstruction of justice
or perjury, which are second degree felonies. Id. Morris then informed the court he was
not going to testify. Id. at p. 51. Both the State and the defense proceed to ask Morris
questions. Id. at p. 52. He refused to answer the questions and informed the court he would
refuse to answer all questions. Id. at pp. 52-53.
Based upon Morris' refusal to answer the questions, the court found that he was in
direct contempt of court. Id. at p. 54. Morris was ordered to spend thirty (30) days in jail,
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which would run consecutive to his prison term, and pay a $1,000 fine. Id. The court
indicated that the State could screen the test and determine if any more charges would be
filed against him. Id. The trial court again asked Morris if he was going to comply with
the court's order to testify, to which he indicated he was not. Id.
After the court's January 30 th oral order from the Bench, the written Ruling and
Order - Contempt ofCourt Re: Darrell Wayne Morris; Order ofCommitment; Warrant in
Aid of Commitment was entered on February 12, 2015. RL:02215. In such Order the trial

court indicated that Morris had been offered immunity for his testimony, and that Morris
refused to answer questions. RL:02215. Morris was seated on the stand and he refused to
answer questions. Id. The trial court also indicated it had found that Morris had no Fifth
Amendment privilege based upon the immunity offer, and that Morris was found in
contempt of court for his failure to testify. Id. The trial court ordered that Morris pay
$1,000 fine and serve thirty (30) days in the County jail for such contempt, consecutive to
the time he was already serving in prison. RL:02214. On March 13, 2015 Notice of
Appeal-Contempt of Court-in regard to Witness Darrell Wayne Morris was filed.

,

RL:02254.
C. Trial February 4, 2015

1. Testimony of Brandon David Wright

Brandon David Wright ('"Wright") testified that he had been in prison and at some
point joined a prison gang. R002419: 117. He testified that when he left prison he told the
gang he would no longer be associated with them. Id. Wright testified that he ended up
back in prison because he started drinking and got three (3) DUI's in a two-and-a-half week
21

period. Id. at p. 118. He testified that Logue had spoken to him about Andy's death while
they were incarcerated together and Logue was awaiting trial on this matter. Id.

He

testified that Logue and Morris were both members of this gang. Id. Wright testified that
Morris was in superior position to Logue in the gang. Id. at p. 120. He testified that one
of the conditions of the gang was that you help other members when asked and that you do
not inform or testify against other members of the gang. Id. at p. 121. Wright testified if
you did not do these things, you could be beaten up or seriously injured. Id. He testified
that he never read any of the police reports related to this matter. Id. at p. 129. Wright
testified that by testifying he was also violating a rule of the gang. Id. at p. 130.
D. Trial February 6, 2015
1. Testimony of Brayden Hathaway

Brayden Hathaway ("Hathaway") testified he had been in prison since May 9,
2011. R002421:74. He testified that he had been a cellmate of Logue's. Id. at p. 75.
Hathaway testified that Logue had legal papers in his cell and that Wright came to the
prison in March of 2014. Id. at p. 76. He testified that he saw Wright look at Logue's legal
papers several times. Id. at p. 77. Hathaway testified that he had also looked at the papers.
Id. at p. 99.

E. The State Filed a Felony Obstructing Justice Charge Against Morris
On or about April 29, 2015, the State filed an Information charging Morris with
Obstructing Justice, a Second Degree Felony. This felony charge against Morris is based
on the trial court's denial of the motion to quash, the refusal of Morris to testify against
Logue, and the trial court holding Morris in contempt resulting in the Contempt Order.
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Morris is appealing both the Contempt Order and the Denial of the Motion to Quash.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 indicates that a court may quash or modify a subpoena if it
believes that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable.

Morris was

subpoenaed to testify at Logue's trial. Both Morris and Logue are members of the prison
gang SAW. The rules of the gang prohibit the members from testifying against each other.
If a member testifies they run a substantial risk of receiving serious bodily injury or even
being killed by other gang members in retaliation. Morris testifying would have put him
at such risk. Under UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 a subpoena may be quashed if compliance with
such subpoena would be unreasonable. UT. R. CIV. P. 45 supplements this concept by
indicating that, "[a]n order compelling compliance shall protect the person subject to or
affected by the subpoena from significant expense or harm." The trial court erred in failing
to quash the subpoena because the substantial risk of injury or death that Morris faced if
he complied with the subpoena was unreasonable and placed him in harm; thus, it should
have been quashed.

,

Under the U.S. CONST. AMEND. Va person cannot be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against themselves. The subpoena served upon Morris by the State
attempted to do exactly what the United States prohibits, which is to compel Morris to
testify against himself. Morris has a privilege to not testify against himself under the Fifth
Amendment. The U.S. Department of Justice Petite Policy is not law and is only a
discretionary policy of the prosecuting arm of the federal government. Based upon this,
the trial court erred in determining that Morris did not have any privilege to assert under
23

the Fifth Amendment in not testifying. Morris had the right under the Fifth Amendment
to not testify and incriminate himself. Although he had reached a plea agreement in this
matter, it is possible that his testimony could have raised new offenses that the State was
not aware of, for which he could later be charged by the state or the federal government.
Thus, he had the right to refuse to testify under such privilege and the trial court erred in
determining otherwise.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE
ISSUE OF MORRIS BEING AT SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF BODILY HARM
OR DEATH IF HE TESTIFIED AS RAISED IN HIS MOTION TO QUASH.
UT. R. C1v. P. 45 generally governs the procedure for subpoenas in cases throughout

the State of Utah, stating as follows:
Every subpoena shall: (a)(l)(A) issue from the court in which the action is
pending; (a)(l)(B) state the title and case number of the action, the name of
the court from which it is issued, and the name and address of the party or
attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena; (a)(l)(C) command each
person to whom it is directed (a)(l)(C)(i) to appear and give testimony at a
trial, hearing or deposition, ... (a)( I )(D) if an appearance is required, specify
the date, time and place for the appearance ... (b)(l) A subpoena may be
served by any person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the
case. Service of a subpoena upon the person to whom it is directed shall be
made as provided in Rule 4(d). (b)(2) If the subpoena commands a person's
appearance, the party or attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena shall
tender with the subpoena the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage
allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on behalf of the United States,
or this state, or any officer or agency of either, fees and mileage need not be
tendered ... e)(3) The person subject to the subpoena or a non-party affected
by the subpoena may object under Rule 37 if the subpoena: ... (e)(5) If
objection is made, or if a party requests a protective order, the party or
attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena is not entitled to compliance
but may request an order to compel compliance under Rule 37(a). The
objection or request shall be served on the other parties and on the person
subject to the subpoena. An order compelling compliance shall protect the
24
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person subject to or affected by the subpoena from significant expense or
harm. The court may quash or modify the subpoena. If the party or attorney
responsible for issuing the subpoena shows a substantial need for the
information that cannot be met without undue hardship, the court may order
compliance upon specified conditions.
(Emphasis added). UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides more specifics with regard to subpoenas
in criminal cases:
(a)( 1) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before
a court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation
or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with whom an information is
filed, the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon the
direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an information or indictment
is to be tried ... An attorney admitted to practice in the court in which the
action is pending may also issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of the
court ... (b) The court may quash or modify the subpoena ifcompliance would
be unreasonable .... (c) Applicability of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The provisions of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall
govern the content, issuance, and service of subpoenas to the extent that those
provisions are consistent with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(Emphasis added). In State v. Gonzales the Utah Supreme Court discusses the application
of the rules of civil procedure in criminal matters, specifically addressing Rules 14 and 45
set forth supra:

,

The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are subject to some of the
requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Prominent among these
is civil rule 8l(e), which states, "[t]hese rules of [civil] procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional requirement." Utah R. Civ. P. 81 ( e) ....
The applicability of civil rule 81 cannot be determined by merely comparing
rule titles, index entries, or the contents of the rules of criminal and civil
procedure. Instead, our "applicable statute or rule" analysis obliges us to
consider the text and purposes of the related statutes and rules, and thereby
determine whether an applicable rule of civil procedure should be grafted
into a rule of criminal procedure through civil rule 81. An inquiry central to
this task is the assessment of what more a civil rule may permit or require
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than the criminal rule on a similar topic, and what reasons, if any, justify the
differences.
The civil subpoena rules are both more comprehensive and more exacting
than the criminal rules. For example, rule 14(b) states that a court may quash
or modify a subpoena if compliance is "unreasonable," but provides no
further guidance. Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b). In contrast, civil rules 45(c)(3)(A)
and (B) each provide for four occasions when the court may quash or modify
the subpoena, and provide direction for doing so. Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A),
(B). Similarly, civil rule 45 expressly addresses the status of unsubpoenaed
persons who are present in the courtroom whose testimony is sought, while
criminal rule 14 does not. Criminal rule 14 also does not specify what
information is required to appear on a subpoena, such as name or address,
whereas civil rule 45(a) provides detailed instructions concerning the
contents of any subpoena.
Ibid., 2005 UT 72, ,i,i27, 29-30, 125 P.3d 878. After its analysis, the Gonzales court
ultimately determined that "Rule 45(b )( 1)(A)'s notification requirement applies to criminal
matters where privileged information is at stake." Id. at ,i 41.
Gonzales further stated that, "the right to cross-examine 'does not entail the right to
harass, annoy, or humiliate [the] witness on cross-examination, nor to engage in repetitive
questioning, nor to inquire into matters which would expose the witness to danger of
physical harm."' Ibid., 2005 UT 72, iJ48, 125 P.3d 878, citing State v. Hacliford, 737 P.2d
200, 203 (Utah 1987)(quoting State v. Chesnut, 621 P .2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980) ).

In

Piemonte v. United States it states that, "if two persons witness an offense---one being an
innocent bystander and the other an accomplice who is thereafter imprisoned for his
participation-the latter has no more right to keep silent than the former. The Government
ofcourse has an obligation to protect its citizens from harm." Ibid, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2,
81 S.Ct. 1720 ( 1961 ). (Emphasis added). In Wang v. Reno it discusses that when a person

26

•

is in the custody of the State, the State has some responsibility for the person's safety and
well-being as follows:
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services., the
Court held that 'when the State takes a person into his custody and holds
him there against his will, the Constitution imposes some responsibility
for his safety and general well-being." [footnote omitted] In so holding, the
Court explained that when the government creates a special relationship
with a person by placing him in a vulnerable situation, the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause obligates the government to
provide for that person's basic needs and to protect him from
deprivations of liberty. Id. 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005,
103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Having placed Wang in custody, the government
had an obligation to protect him from liberty deprivations he faced by
virtue of his testimony in court .... Wang has proven facts sufficient to
establish a violation of his liberty interest in personal security and thus of
his due process rights secured by the Fifth Amendment. See Wood, 879
F.2d at 591 n. 8.,

Ibid., 81 F.3d 808, 816-20 (9 th Circuit) (1996). Alternative means of either obtaining
information from witnesses or evidence have been utilized by investigators when there is
a strong likelihood that the witnesses will be reluctant to testify, even under grant of
immunity, because they fear retaliation. See, e.g., US. v. Mascarenas, 30 Fed.Appx. 784,
793 (10 th Cir. 2002)(investigators sought ability to use wiretap where witnesses were coconspirators or feared retaliation and would likely accept contempt as an alternative).

'

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-302(1) states that, "[w]hen a contempt is committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished
summarily. An order shall be made, reciting the facts occurring in the immediate view and
presence of the court. The order shall state that the person proceeded against is guilty of a
contempt and shall be punished as described in Section 78B-6-310." UTAH CODE ANN.
§78B-6-301(10) provides that contempt can include, " ... disobedience of a subpoena duly
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served, or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness; ... " UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6310 sets forth the punishment for contempt as imposition of a fine not exceeding $1,000,
or incarceration in the county jail not to exceed 30 days, or both. "While imprisonment
cannot be used to coerce evidence after a trial has terminated, ... , it is unquestioned that
imprisonment for a definite term may be imposed to punish the contemnor in vindication
of the authority of the court.'' Yates v. U.S., 355 U.S. 66, 72, 78 S.Ct. 128, 132, 2 L.Ed.2d
95 (1957), citing Yates v. United States, 9 Cir. 227 F.2d 844; cf Campers v. Bucks Stove
& Range Co., 1911, 221 U.S. 418,443,449, 31 S.Ct. 492,498, 501, 55 L.Ed.2d 797.

Herein, Morris filed a Motion to Quash the State's subpoena commanding him to
appear and testify at Logue' s trial. Morris filed such motion based on the fact that testifying
against Logue put him at the risk of bodily harm from SAW members. Morris had a
justifiable fear for his life, which was supported by another member's information provided
to the prosecution and to the court through Logue's motion to exclude jailhouse snitch
testimony
At Logue's trial on January 30, 2015, Morris' counsel argued Morris became an
adverse party when he pled, asking that Morris' plea negotiations be admitted as an

•
exception under the rules of evidence to evidence Morris's deal with the State to not testify
against Logue. R0001294:8. Morris' counsel indicated the State had reserved the right to
call Morris, but that it was Morris' understanding they would not. Id. The State argued
that the plea deal that included not testifying was rejected by Morris because of the severity
of the crimes to which he would plead. Id. at p. 9. They argued that Morris accepted the
plea knowing that he could be called to testify. Id.
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The State indicated it had a return of service for the subpoena and that Morris' letter
to them clearly shows he received the subpoena. Id. at p. 10. Morris' counsel points out
that no return of service has been filed with the court. Id. at p. 11. Morris' counsel also
pointed out that weight should be given to what the State told Morris on July 15, 2014, that
it did not intend to call Morris as a witness unless it was in their rebuttal case. Id.
Information on the record about letters received from Wright, and testimony given
by Wright at trial indicated Morris and Logue were members of the SAW prison gang.
Wright's independently evidenced fear of the SAW members. Wright wrote in a letter to
prosecutors that SAW ordered him to carry out a stabbing, even though he was retired from
the gang, informing him that if he did not do it then they "would have to send me out
sideways." RL 1510-11. They informed Wright that they had already ordered two other
stabbings carried out within the prison walls in the last year, and they provided a shank to
Wright to carry out the order. Id. Wright had to act as though he was carrying out the
order by creating an obvious commotion to get officers to stop it, and he walked away with
a charge for possession of a shank. Id. Wright sought protection in exchange for his
testimony, evidencing a paranoia about testifying against another member. Id. Wright
asked not just for immunity, but for a transfer to Olympus, noting he would be on gang hit
lists here and wanted to leave Utah for good. Id.
UT. R.

CIV.

P. 45(e)(5) dictates that the trial court compelling Morris' compliance

with the subpoena herein "shall protect" him from "significant ... harm." This rule of civil
procedure applies to these criminal proceedings given that there is no other applicable
statute or rule defining the "unreasonable" verbiage utilized in UT. R. CRIM. P. 14(b). See,
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UT. R. C1v. P. 81(e). Rule 45(e)(5) applied to these proceedings would not conflict with
any statutory or constitutional requirement. Id.; Gonzales at

,r,r27,

29-30. Gonzales

recognized particularly that Rule 45(e)(5) was more comprehensive and exacting than Rule
l 4(b ). Id. It is likely that this was due to their individual purposes. The purpose behind
Rule 45(e)(5) is to provide a limitation on the subpoena powers to the extent that
compliance would not harm an individual, placing a burden on the State to ensure their
protection. The purpose of Rule l 4(b) is similar but broadly states that the subpoena cannot
be "unreasonable" in any fashion. Thus, Rule 45(e)(5) provides a more particularized idea
of the type of unreasonableness that would not be tolerated through the subpoena powers.
Given the nature of criminal proceedings to produce potential for substantial bodily harm
or death through retaliation for testimony more readily than civil proceedings, it is
appropriate that Rule 45(e)(5) apply to criminal procedures to protect witnesses. The

Gonzales court ultimately determined that "Rule 45(b)(l)(A)'s notification requirement
applies to criminal matters where privileged information is at stake." Id. at ,r 41. Similarly,
this Court should graft Rule 45(e)(5) into Rule 14(b), particularly so as to ensure that the
government's duty is articulated.
The United States Supreme Court law recognizes the duty the State has to ensure it
has protected its potential witnesses. See, Piemonte, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1720
(1961). Although Piemonte recognized Morris' duty to testify, it also held that "[t]he
Government of course has an obligation to protect its citizens from harm." Id. This is
particularly true when that citizen is in State's custody, as Morris currently is with his
incarceration from his plea. Wang, 81 F.3d at 816-20; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109
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S.Ct. at 1005. The State created a special relationship with Morris by placing him in
a vulnerable situation in subpoenaing him to testify at Logue's trial,

invoking the

substantive component of the Due Process Clause obligating the State to provide for
Morris' basic needs and to protect him from harm. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109
S.Ct. at 1005. The State and trial court offered Morris no protection at all, and the trial
court did not require them to do so prior to finding Morris in contempt for failing to testify,
even though the issue of fear of retaliation and harm was raised below. With abundant
knowledge of the substantial risk of bodily harm or death to Morris and others by the SAW
prison gang, the State and trial court failed to inquire about transferring Morris to a safe
location away from other SAW inmates at the Utah State Prison. For example, the State
or trial court could have transferred Morris to a County Jail facility in order to protect
Morris from such substantial risk of bodily harm or death but failed to do so.

Gonzales informs us that Logue would not have had the right to confront and crossexamine Morris to the extent that it would expose him to danger of physical harm. Ibid. at
148, citing Hackford, at 203(quoting Chesnut at 1233). The State should not be afforded a

greater ability to place Morris in danger of physical harm by directly examining him

"

anymore than Logue would be able to do on cross-examination. A person's physical safety
transcends the evidence that could be gleaned in testimony, at least to the extent that proper
measures are offered and put in place to ensure they are protected in light of their testimony.
Further, Morris' testimony appears to have been unnecessary since the jury convicted
Logue without it.
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The weight of Morris' testimony against the harm that could have been afforded as
a result clearly evidenced that it was unnecessary for the State to procure his testimony for
a conviction. Alternative means could have been utilized to obtain the information, of
which some were, in order to protect Morris and dispel the fear of retaliation. See, e.g.,

Mascarenas at 793. Other witnesses testified to the information that would have been
asked of Morris, and much information was gleaned from Wright, who was a jailhouse
snitch who had apparent first-hand confession from Logue. Overall, Morris' testimony was
unnecessary to Logue's conviction and simply sought after by the State to harass Morris.
For these and other purposes argued herein, Morris sought to quash the subpoena,
citing gang retaliation as "significant harm" from which he was requiring protection. UT.
R. CRIM. P. l 4(b) further provided that the court could quash the subpoena on grounds that
it was unreasonable to expect Morris to testify against Logue. Morris' plea agreement did
not require it of him and the State assured him that they likely would not call him as a
witness in the case. It was unreasonable, given the weight of the other evidence they had
against Logue, to expect Morris to place his life in danger to provide what little extra they
think they may have obtained from him-information that was unnecessary to conviction
as is apparent from the fact that Logue was convicted without it.
Because Morris appeared before the court to decline testifying, it was proper to have
determined the matter of contempt summarily; however, his prior written Motion to Quash
warranted further examination by evidentiary hearing into the fear of retaliation prior to its
entry. See, UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-302(1); §78B-6-301(10). Morris was punished with
contempt of court, incarceration for 30 days to be run consecutive to his current sentence,
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and a $1,000 court fine. UTAH CODE ANN . §78B-6-310. The trial has concluded, making
Morris' punishment in vindication of the authority of the court. Yates, 355 U.S. at 72, 78
S.Ct. at 132, citing Yates, 227 F.2d 844; cf Campers, 221 U.S. at 449, 31 S.Ct. at 501.
Such vindication was at the discretion of the trial court; however, the trial court erred in
ordering contempt herein due to the fact that the weight of Morris' testimony coupled with
the fear of prison gang retaliation did not require vindication, but instead relief by way of
it quashing his subpoena.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MORRIS HAD
NO FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE TO ASSERT.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V discusses an individual's right to not be compelled to be a

witness against themselves as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of
war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
In American Fork City v. Crosgrove the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "the
manifest purpose of the constitutional provisions, both of the States and of the United
States, is to prohibit the compelling of testimony of a self-incriminating kind from a party
or a witness."

Ibid., 701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985).

The Supreme Court later

determined that, "the Fifth Amendment right to silence is a comprehensive privilege that
can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory." State v. Butt, 2012 UT 34, ,it l , 284 P.3d 605. "[T]he
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privilege against self-incrimination (the privilege) embodied in the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution protects "an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature." State v. VanDyke, 2009 UT App 369, i\26, 223 P.3d 465, citing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

Our United States Supreme Court has "consistently held that the necessity for
expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist
the production of desired information to a choice between compliance with a trial court's
order to produce prior to any review of that order; and resistance to that order with the
concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal."
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460, 95 S.Ct. 584, 592, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975), citing
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (citing
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Alexander
v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906); cf United States v. Blue,

384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966); Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S.
121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 77 S.Ct.
1332, 1 L.Ed.2d 1442 (1957)).
This method of achieving precompliance review is particularly appropriate
where Fifth Amendment privilege [footnote omitted] against selfincrimination is involved. The privilege has ancient roots [citations omitted]
This Court has always broadly construed its protection to assure that an
individual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be used
against him as an accused in a criminal action. [citations omitted]. The
protection does not merely encompass evidence which may lead to criminal
conviction, but includes information which would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence which an individual reasonably believes could be used
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against him in a criminal prosecution. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479,486, 71 S.Ct. 814,818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). In view of the place this
privilege occupies in the Constitution and in our adversary system of justice,
as well as the traditional respect for individual that undergirds the privilege,
the procedure described in Ryan seems an eminently reasonable method to
allow precompliance review.

Id. (emphasis added).
In US. v. Barrett, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the Double Jeopardy
Clause portion of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, which is assistive to this
case:
"The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause states that, '[n]o person
shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."' United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475,478 (7 th Cir. 2003)(quoting U.S.
Const. amend. V). "The Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as
prohibiting not only multiple punishments for the same crime, but also
multiple prosecutions as well." Id. (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
688, 695-96, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993)). "One significant
limitation exists, however, to the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.'" Id. "It is known as the dual sovereignty doctrine, under which courts
recognize that the Clause is no bar to serial prosecution and punishment
undertaken by separate soverign entities." Id. (citing Health v. Alabama, 4 74
U.S. 82, 88, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985)). The Supreme Court has
explained that the doctrine "is founded on the common-law conception of
crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government," and "[w]hen
a defendant in a single act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns
by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct 'offences."'
Heath, 474 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 433. In other words, the "doctrine is best
understood ... not as an exception to double jeopardy, but rather as a
manifestation of the maxim that where a defendant violates the law of two
sovereigns, he commits separate offenses." United States v. Angleton, 314
F.3d 767, 771 (5 th Cir. 2002)(italics in original).

Ibid., 496 F.3d 1079, 1117-8 (10 th Cir. 2007). Recently, in US. v. Roberto Miromantes
Roman, the United States District Court for the District of Utah applied the dual
sovereignty doctrine to defeat defendant's request for dismissal of a charge in federal court
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on grounds of Double Jeopardy for a murder for which Roman was acquitted by a jury in
state court. Ibid., Case No. 2:13-cr-00602-DN-DBP-l, U.S. District Court Judge David
Nuffer presiding. In Roman, Judge Nuffer ruled that, "although Mr. Roman cites many
academic works that criticize the dual sovereignty doctrine, and makes the argument that
the doctrine is contrary to the view espoused by the Framers at the inception of this
country's foundation, he fails to cite any case overruling the doctrine." See, Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motions to Dismiss Under Double Jeopardy
Clause, filed September 30, 2014 (the "Roman Denial"). Judge Nuffer concluded that,

"[t]herefore, his request to eradicate the doctrine from American jurisprudence cannot be
granted by this court since 'lower courts are required to follow the precedential decisions
of higher courts on questions of law."' Id. at pp. 5-6, citing B. T ex. rel. G. T v. Santa Fe
Public Schools, 506 F.Supp.2d 718, 724-25 (citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375

( 1982)). After being acquitted by a state jury trial of a state murder charge, Roman was
criminally charged in federal court with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961-racketeering, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1111-murder, and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1117---conspiracy to murder.
On July 15, 2014 the Second Amended Information was entered for Morris. It
charged Morris with Manslaughter, a second degree felony; Obstructing Justice, a second
degree felony; and Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by
Restricted Person, a third degree felony. RM:01234. On July 15, 2014 the Statement of
Defendant in Support of Plea of Guilty or No Contest and Certificate of Counsel was filed
("Plea Agreement"), RM:R01244.

On July 15, 2014, the Sentence, Judgment, and

Commitment was entered. RM:R01228. Thereafter, Morris was subpoenaed to testify
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against Logue; however, Morris had also been a co-defendant in the crime charged against
Logue and had entered a plea deal with the State. Morris argued that he should not have
to testify based upon his right under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Morris appeared and refused to testify, citing not only possible harm or death because of
his gang involvement, as is discussed more specifically supra. In his previously filed
Motion to Quash, Morris also invoked his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to not
incriminate himself. Morris did not wish to be compelled to give testimony that would
incriminate him in any other crime that could be charged against him with regard to the
incident.
Morris maintained the right to not be compelled to be a witness against himself by
testifying in Logue's criminal trial. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; Butt at

in 1. Morris and Logue

were codefendants charged separately with respect to the same incident involving the death
of another. Any information that the State intended to elicit from Morris on the stand in
Logue's trial would have necessarily been of the "self-incriminating kind." Crosgrove at
1072. Testifying in Logue's trial would have "provide[d] the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature" from Morris, and was thus subject to his Fifth
Amendment rights. VanDyke at i!26, citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826.
Morris was faced with the impossible choice of either complying with the subpoena
and testifying against Logue to his own detriment with regard to the fear of physical harm
as well as his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or resistance to that order
with the possibility of being found in contempt and being charged by the State with
Obstruction of Justice, a second degree felony. Maness, 419 U.S. at 460, 95 S.Ct. at 592,
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citing Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532-533, 91 S.Ct. at 1582 (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. 323, 60
S.Ct. 540); Alexander, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356; cf Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416;
Di Bella, 369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654; Carroll, 354 U.S. 394, 77 S.Ct. 1332. Morris should
not have been compelled to produce evidence or information that later could either be used
against him as an accused in a criminal action or which would furnish a link in the chain
of evidence which could reasonably be used against him in a separate criminal prosecution.
See, id., citing Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818.

Ill

The idea of a separate criminal prosecution is not hypothetical in nature. While the
State and the trial court believed that the granting of state immunity was sufficient to moot
any Fifth Amendment claim Morris may have with regard to self-incrimination, they were
mistaken. Morris is subject to possible prosecution in another sovereignty-federal courtfor the crime to which he plead guilty in state court. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111 and
1117. Although normally this would rise to a Double Jeopardy violation, the dual
sovereignty doctrine would allow him to be tried and convicted in both, as noted by our
10 th Circuit. Barrett at 1117-8; see e.g., Long at 478, U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, Dixon, 509
U.S. at 695-96, 113 S.Ct. 2849; Heath, 474 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 433. The crimes to which
Morris plead in state court is considered a crime against the sovereignty of the
government-both state and federal. Id., citing Heath, 474 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 433;
Angleton at 771.
Additionally, gang members are oftentimes prosecuted by the federal government
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68, and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering ("VICAR") statute, 18 U.S.C. §
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1959, without offending double jeopardy principles. Pursuant to the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine, the double jeopardy principle isn't violated by successive prosecutions or
cumulative punishment for RICO and VICAR offenses and state offenses that are charged
as predicate racketeering acts underlying the RICO and VICAR offenses even if they arose
from the same conduct and had the same elements. In that regard, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive federal and state

'

prosecutions for offenses arising from the same acts. See United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). The rationale underlying
this rule lies in the concept of "dual sovereignty," which the Supreme Court has
summarized as follows:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources,
capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory ....
Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace
and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be
punished by each .... Here the same act was an offense against the State of
Washington, because a violation of its law, and also an offense against the
United States under the National Prohibition Act. The defendants thus
committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction by a court
of Washington of the offense against that state is not a conviction of the
different offense against the United States, and so is not double jeopardy.

Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.
The Supreme Court also has explicitly held that the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is
not defeated even where there is substantial cooperation between the two sovereignties
involved. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 319-320; Barkus, 359 U.S. at 122-123. Indeed, the
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Supreme Court has noted that cooperation between the state and federal government "is
the conventional practice between [state and federal] prosecutors throughout the country,"
and was perfectly proper. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 122-123.
In accordance with the foregoing authority, every federal court of appeals that has
decided the issue has held that under the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and double jeopardy
principle are not violated by charging state offenses on which the defendant previously had
been acquitted or convicted in state prosecutions as RICO predicate racketeering acts. See,
e.g., United States v. Giovanelli, 945 F.2d 479, 491-93 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386,396
(2d Cir, 1989); United States v. Russotti, 717 F .2d 27, 30-32 (2d Cir. 1983 ), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1022 (1984 ); United States v. Aleman, 609 F .2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1142-43 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 ( 1980).
This is not just a far-reaching possibility for Morris to be charged in federal court.
Such courses have been taken recently within the State of Utah at the federal level. See,
Roman, supra. Federal Judge Nuffer, U.S. District Court for Utah, ruled against Roman's
request for dismissal based on Double Jeopardy grounds, citing the dual sovereignty
doctrine as support for the Court's decision that Roman could be tried on a charge of
murder to which he was actually acquitted in district court. See, Roman Denial. As Judge
Nuffer pointed out, Morris is subject to this doctrine until the United States Supreme Court
overrules it, which had not occurred as of the decision in that matter, nor has it occurred
yet. If Morris had testified against Logue, and that testimony was used to bring charges
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against him in federal court, Morris would not have an argument for Double Jeopardy in
eradication of the doctrine from American jurisprudence due to the doctrine of vertical
stare decisis. Roman Denial at pp. 5-6, citing B. T at 724-25 (citing Hutto at 375). The
only means by which to protect Morris' rights was to allow him to plead his Fifth
Amendment rights, which remained intact given the collateral consequences possibly
attending federal charges.
In Morris, Judge Pullan cited generally to the following U.S. Department of Justice
Petite Policy in the trial court's ruling that Morris did not have a Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to testify in the Logue trial:
This policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution,
following a prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially the same
act(s) or transaction(s) unless three substantive prerequisites are satisfied:
first, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; second, the prior
prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third,
applying the same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the
government must believe that the defendant's conduct constitutes a federal
offense, and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain
and sustain a conviction by an unbiased trier of fact. In addition, there is a
procedural prerequisite to be satisfied, that is, the prosecution must be
approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General.

,

Dual and Successive Prosecution Policy ("Petite Policy"), United States Attorneys
Manual, Title 9: Criminal, 9-2.031 (1 ).
The trial court ruled that the Petite Policy and Morris' plea agreement would have
prevented a "fanciful and merely speculative" federal dual-sovereign prosecution.
However, the Petite Policy is discretionary by the prosecuting arm of government. The
Petite Policy is not law.

Rather, it is "merely an internal guideline for exercise of

prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial review." United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d
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718, 725 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Gruttadauria, 439 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247 (U.S.
District Court, E.D. New York 2006). In 2007, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "'[t]he Petite policy 'is merely a housekeeping provision of the Department [of
Justice]' that, 'at most,' serves as 'a guide for the use of the Attorney General and the
United States Attorneys in the field, and thus does not confer any enforceable rights upon
criminal defendants."' United States v. Barrett, 496 F. 3d 1079, 1120 (10th Cir. 2007)
(inside citations omitted). Taken to its logical extension, the Petite Policy does not confer
an enforceable Fifth Amendment or Double Jeopardy protection for criminal defendants
that they will not be prosecuted by a dual sovereign entity for crimes defendants pled guilty
to in a state court. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that Morris' plea and 1-15 year
concurrent prison sentence did not vindicate all of the state or federal interests in Morris'
case given that the co-defendant, Danny Leroy Logue, was convicted at trial on all counts
and was sentenced to serve life without parole at the Utah State Prison. The large disparity
in the co-defendants' sentences -- for arguably equal culpability -- lends credence to the
federal government's interest in prosecuting Morris just as Mr. Roman was charged for a
serious crime after the state case was conclude.
Thus, like Mr. Roman, Morris and other similarly-situated state defendants are at
risk of a dual-sovereign prosecution by federal prosecutors. Although the State of Utah
offered immunity to Morris, the U.S. Attorney's Office did not. Nonetheless, even with
State immunity, the State and trial court failed to address Morris' safety and harm concerns
regarding SAW prison gang retaliation, as argued more particularly supra.
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Morris had the right under the Fifth Amendment to not testify in any criminal
proceeding that would cause him to be a witness against himself. It was not possible for
him to testify in Logue's trial without incriminating himself, subjecting himself to an
unreasonable and substantial risk of physical harm or death, and producing information
that later could subject him to federal criminal action by direct evidence or by a simple link
in evidence. Morris' testimony could have led to other charges in another sovereignty that
maintains the ability to charge him without violating Double Jeopardy. Under the Fifth
Amendment, Morris was not required to testify if it would lead to incriminating him.
Cosgrove at 1072. Morris had the right to claim such privilege because it protects him

from providing the State with information upon which further charges could be filed
against him in state or federal court. Butt at ill 1, VanDyke at i!26. He invoked this right
as a protection; however, the trial court erroneously denied him such right by finding him
in contempt, failing to protect him from a substantial risk of harm or death, with the trial
court abusing its discretion by finding that Morris did not have a remaining Fifth
Amendment privilege after the granting of immunity by the State. Such decision must be
reversed in support of protecting Morris' rights.
CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Morris requests that this Court reverse his contempt of court
conviction, reverse the trial court' s denial of the motion to quash of the Morris subpoena,
and remand this matter with instructions for the trial court to dismiss, with prejudice, the
State' s current charge of Obstruction of Justice, a second degree felony, and grant any
further relief it deems necessary.
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DATED this 30th day ofNovember, 2015.
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I hereby certify that I sent, via E-mail and U.S. Mail, a true and correct copy, postage

pre-paid, of Notice of Lodging a copy of the foregoing BriefofAppellant, this 30th day of
November, 2015, to the following:
Utah Attorney General's Office
Attn. Criminal Appellate Division
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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Addendum '""A'""
Ruling and Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell
Wayne Morris, dated February 12, 2015

.,

FILED
rrr,

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

r t.rJ 1

2 <-'JO,, n~

~ih DI S 1n ,c r
";. TAT[

or

ST ATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

DANNY LEROY LOGUE,
Defendant,
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE MORR.IS,

UT• M

VTAl'f CCV'l'T '-'

RULING AND ORDER CONTEMPT OF COURT RE: DARRELL
\VA YNE MORRIS
CascNo.111401543
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN

Witness.

This matter comes before the court during the jury trial in the above captioned case. On
January 30, 2015, day seven of that jury trial, the State called Darrell Wayne Morris to testify.
Mr. Morris was under subpoena and represented by Gregory Stewart and Neil Skousen. Before
taking the witness stand and outside the presence of the jury, the State offered Mr. Morris use
immunity for his testimony. Mr. Morris discussed this with his counsel, but refused to testify in
this case. Mr. Morris was then brought in by the Department of Corrections and seated in the
witness stand. After taking the witness stand in the presence of the jury and being directed by the
Court to testify in this case. Mr. Morris refused to answer any questions.
Outside the presence of the jury, the Court found that with that grant of immunity Mr.
Morris had no 5th Amendment privilege not to testify, and that if he refused to testify he would
be held in contempt of court and punished as prescribed in § 788-6-310, and could be subject to
prosecution for obstruction of justice and perjury. Mr. Morris indicated that it \Vas still his
intention not to testify. The Court found Mr. Morris in direct contempt of court. Pursuant to §

"
788-6-310, the Court ordered Mr. Morris to pay a$ I000 fine and to serve 30 days in the county
jail, to run consecutively to the time he is currently serving in prison.
Consistent with the Court·s verbal ruling, and pursuant to§ 78B-6-302, the Court hereby
FINDS and ORDERS:

•

Darrell Wayne Morris is guilty of contempt in the immediate view and presence
of the Court;

•

Pursuant to§ 78B-6-310, Mr. Morris is ordered to pay a S 1000 fine and serve 30
days in the county jail, consecutive to the time he is currently serving in prison.

DATED this

•

/tl

day of February, 2015.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WARRANT IN AID OF
COMMITTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

DANNY LEROY LOGUE,

Case No. 111401543

Defendant,
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE MORRIS,
Witness.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
On January 30, 2015, Darrell Wayne Morris was found in direct contempt of court under
Utah Code§ 78B-6-302. (See Ruling and Order-Contempt of Court Re: Darrell Wayne Morris,
Case No. 11 1401543, Feb. 12, 2015).
NOW THEREFORE, YOU ARE COMMANDED to arrest DARRELL WAYNE
MORRIS upon his release from the Utah State Prison to serve 30 days in the Utah County Jail
for Contempt of Court.

•

DATEDthis

/4=.

dayofFebruary,2015.
BY THE COURT:

•

"
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAHCOUNT~STATEOFUTAH

ORDER OF COMMITMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

Case No. 111401543

DANNY LEROY LOGUE,

JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN

Defendant,
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE MORRIS,
Witness.

Darrell Wayne Morris was found guilty of direct contempt of court under Utah Code §
78B-6-302 on January 30, 2015. (See Ruling and Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell Wayne
Morris, Case No. 111401543, Feb. 12, 2015).
Pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-6-310, Mr. orris is ordered to pay a $1000 fine and serve 30
days in the Utah County Jail upon his release from the Utah State Prison.
DATEDthis

/_,;:- dayofFebruary,2015.

,
BY THE COURT:

'

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 111401543 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
MANUAL EMAIL:
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL

CURTIS L LA.~SON curtisl~utahcounty.gov
RY.P.N B MCBRIDE ryanm~utahcounty.gov
NEIL SKOUSEN Ndskousen@aol.com
GREGORY V STEWART greg.stewart@usa.net
UTAH STATE PRISON marialister~utah.gov
UTA.q COUNTY JAIL jailrecords@utahcounty.gov

02/13/2015

/s/ MYKEL DALLEY

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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